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In the mid-1990s there are a great many concerns about the continu 
ing ineffective functioning of the U.S. labor market as evidenced by the 
growing difficulties of high school dropouts and pro-forma graduates 
in gaining access to regular jobs that pay initially or prospectively a 
reasonable wage and provide the holder a basis for future job security 
and income. Other problems include the continuing large differentials 
in the employment experiences of the white majority and selected 
groups of minorities, particularly blacks and Hispanics, the growing 
numbers of long-term corporate white-collar and blue-collar employ 
ees in their forties and fifties who are dismissed as a result of the con 
tinuing downsizing of business firms, and the continuing geographic 
mismatch between concentrations of large numbers of the urban and 
rural poor and areas of employment expansion often located in the out 
lying regions of metropolitan areas.
This list could be expanded to include the vulnerability of workers 
who are computer-illiterate in an era when computerization has 
become the dominant technology. Attention could also be directed to 
the intensified competition in selected locations between the large 
number of native-born marginal workers in search of jobs and incomes 
and the continuing large-scale inflow of immigrants from abroad who 
are seeking opportunities to work and improve their prospects in this 
country. Cognizance must also be taken of the large numbers of per 
sons on welfare who, under appropriate conditions of access to job 
training, child care and health benefits, could be encouraged to work 
and support themselves and their dependents and of the sizable num 
bers of disabled persons who can work only to the extent that employ-
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ers and the community at large lower the physical and other barriers 
that currently interfere with their getting and holding a job.
This restricted list of large groups who continue to face major hur 
dles in gaining entrance into the labor market and becoming self-suffi 
cient through work may provide a useful introduction to the selected 
insights and assessments that will be offered about the two decades 
when active federal manpower policy, as represented by MDTA and 
CETA (1962-1981), was enacted and implemented. There may be a 
number of useful lessons to be extracted from this earlier experience, 
the beginnings of which date back a third of a century. Further, since I 
had the privilege of serving as the chair of the National Commission 
for Employment Policy and its predecessors from 1962 to 1981,1 will 
call attention to selected aspects of the first two decades of federal 
manpower policy that will be of interest and of value to those who con 
tinue to be concerned with improving the operations of the U.S. labor 
market as the nation comes to the end of the twentieth century.
Reflections on MDTA
An analysis of the MDTA experience raises questions as to the 
source of the political momentum that led to this potentially significant 
enlargement of the capacity of the federal government to improve the 
operations of the labor market. There was no strong constituency in 
either the Democratic or Republican parties that had lobbied long and 
hard for federal action such as in the case of medical care for the eld 
erly. Neither did the newly elected president, John F. Kennedy, nor his 
advisors focus much attention on manpower issues as a way of "getting 
the economy moving again," their primary campaign slogan in 1960. 
For the most part they looked to macro demand expansion to revive the 
sluggish economy; improving the match between the unemployed and 
the labor needs and demands of employers was not an issue high on 
this agenda. Rather, the growing unemployment of even skilled work 
ers due to automation became the focus of general concern.
It is worth noting that President Kennedy, in his meeting on Septem 
ber 16, 1962 with the newly appointed members of the National Man 
power Advisory Committee (NMAC), singled out the victims of
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technological change as one of the three categories of workers who 
could benefit the most from the new statute. The other two were poorly 
educated, unskilled youth and those older persons who had lost their 
jobs and would not be likely to find another without a period of retrain 
ing. While waiting to see the President, the members of the NMAC 
heard a gloss from Vice-President Johnson who explained that he had 
successfully lobbied the southern conservative senators to support 
MDTA on the ground that it would help many poor southern blacks 
become self-supporting, with the promise that the administration 
would not publicize the goal.
The scale and scope of the MDTA and the goals that it was intended 
to achieve are reflected in an early session that I had with Secretary of 
Labor Arthur Goldberg after he indicated his intention to appoint me as 
the chair of the NMAC. I explored at some length with the Secretary 
whether the final version of the bill might link a job creation measure 
with new training opportunities. The Secretary informed me that he 
favored such a linkage and had in fact explored it with the White House 
staff. He had been told, however, that MDTA would be solely a training 
measure or there would be no act.
It is my recollection that Senator Joseph Clark and Representative 
Elmer Holland, both from Pennsylvania which was going through 
wrenching industrial change at the time, took the lead on the Demo 
cratic side to push for MDTA, and that they were able to elicit consid 
erable support from several Republicans who were friendly to a 
"structural" approach to remedy the shortfalls in the U.S. labor market 
and had little interest in macro-demand stimulation. In any case we 
know that MDTA had strong bipartisan support throughout the 1960s, 
much of which carried over to CETA in the 1970s until the waning 
days of the Carter administration.
It should be pointed out that a manpower program that first came 
into being because of the nation's growing concern with the adverse 
effects of automation on skilled workers shifted focus over time to the 
severely disadvantaged members of the nation's workforce. MDTA had 
been in operation for less than one year when the research staff of the 
U.S. Department of Labor became aware of the strikingly low level of 
education, training, and skill of many of the MDTA applicants. They 
had initially shared the general assumption that rising unemployment 
was largely a by-product of the advances in automation, and for that
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reason they had concentrated the training programs on persons with at 
least three years of labor market experience.
The enabling legislation had specified that the ten members of the 
NMAC were to consist of representatives of employers and labor with 
additional representatives from the public at large. Secretary of Labor 
Willard Wirtz, who had succeeded Arthur Goldberg when he was 
appointed to the Supreme Court, told of an informal agreement 
between the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO to assign 
three seats to each, but that he persuaded them to settle for two each. 
Clearly, the Congress recognized that the new legislation, to be effec 
tive, had to have the support, or at least avoid the opposition, of either 
or both of the two critical parties whose actions and reactions had such 
a pervasive influence on labor market activities.
One of the two employer representatives on the NMAC who had the 
responsibility of exploring relations with the business community was 
far advanced in gaining the support of the Advertising Council to 
inform the business community and the country at large about the new 
training program when Secretary Wirtz put an end to this effort by 
explaining that he could not personally deal with still one more special 
interest group. I failed to understand then, or now, how a federal train 
ing initiative could go forward without the active involvement and 
input of at least a significant sector of the business community.
Some of the labor representatives on the NMAC were skeptical of 
involvement by the federal government in the training of skilled work 
ers, since that was a critical responsibility of the craft unions. The 
AFL-CIO supported the passage of MDTA but played a relatively 
restrained role until late in the 1960s, when the issue of providing pub 
lic service employment (PSE) opportunities was placed on the national 
agenda. At that point I recall that a principal advisor to George Meany 
and his staff made a special trip to my summer house on Martha's 
Vineyard to offer a trade: strong labor support for the expansion of 
MDTA for NMAC support of PSE. I explained to the emissary that 
while I favored PSE, I could not give him any firm assurance that the 
Committee would agree although I anticipated that the majority 
would do so, as in fact it did. I will indulge myself to point out that in 
the 76 advisory meetings that I chaired over the nineteen-year span, 
only one issue was ever put to a vote. My preference was to send sum 
mary reviews of our meetings to the Secretaries of Labor and HEW, to
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whom we initially reported, and later to the President and the presiding 
officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives, distilling the 
"essence" of our discussions and recommendations. Voting, in my 
view, would harden differences instead of expanding the areas of 
agreement among the members of the advisory committee. To the best 
of my recollection, no member ever challenged any of my summaries. 
With the advantage of hindsight, I might be more inclined today to let 
at least selected issues come to a vote as one way of sharpening and 
clarifying the views of the members.
In the middle 1960s, the MDTA youth component was expanded 
and the antipoverty Economic Opportunity Act added the Neighbor 
hood Youth Corps and the Job Corps. The vocational educational lobby 
in the Congress had strongly supported MDTA when the legislation 
was first discussed and played a key role in its later extension. The fact 
that some large corporations, including leaders in aerospace, were will 
ing to bid on Job Corps contracts added another important interest 
group that favored the expansion of MDTA and other federal training 
efforts. A third new "constituency" consisted of the community-based 
organizations that found an opportunity to organize training programs 
in their local areas and occasionally over a broader area. Some years 
later an astute observer of MDTA concluded that the individuals who 
profited the most from the new training structure were selected minor 
ity members who got an early start on the management ladder and then 
moved into more responsible positions as training programs expanded.
The summer of 1965 saw the outbreak of widespread disturbances 
in many urban areas, including Los Angeles, where black youth and 
adults had become exasperated by the gaps between the promise of 
America and the reality they faced. A quick trip to the area highlighted 
for me the difficulties of any quick and easy solutions since the second 
ary school system was seriously malfunctioning and the absence of 
public transportation between the inner city where the minority poor 
lived and the expanding jobs in the outer regions of the metropolitan 
areas could not be easily resolved, not even with liberal federal trans 
portation subsidies.
President Johnson, in responding to the rioting of 1965, appointed a 
"secret" task force chaired by George Shultz, which consisted of key 
black leaders and white representatives from business, law, and aca 
deme, on which I was invited to serve in my capacity as chair of the
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NMAC. It was to take an in-depth look, at least on a demonstration 
basis, to assure that all children growing up in an urban ghetto could 
enjoy the developmental and educational opportunities that they 
needed to qualify as future workers and family heads.The group took 
its assignment seriously, and after extensive field visits to a number of 
urban ghettos it concluded that adequate schooling from prekindergar- 
ten to the end of high school could be provided only if schools could be 
detached from the existing bureaucratic structures and placed under the 
supervision of a major university's school of education.
The reason that we were a "secret" task force reflected the Presi 
dent's concern that, with the escalation of the war in Vietnam, Con 
gress might not agree to fund new manpower and social welfare 
demonstrations; in such an event, the President didn't want to be 
embarrassed. We had reached a semifinal stage in our deliberations 
with a prospective recommendation of a demonstration budget of about 
$13-14 billion a year. At that point the President's assistant, Joseph 
Califano, came to our meeting and confiscated all copies of our draft 
report.
Determined to do something to improve the employment and 
income prospects for blacks and other poor persons and recognizing 
that new large-scale funding from the Congress would not be forth 
coming, the President assumed the leadership, working with Henry 
Ford II and other business leaders of the National Alliance of Business 
to elicit their help in expanding employment opportunities for the hith 
erto excluded. (In the process the Department of Labor was side 
tracked.) With the labor market booming in the late 1960s, many 
industrialists made a serious effort to respond to the President's 
request, and large numbers of blacks, of both sexes, were hired. Unfor 
tunately, when the downturn in the cycle occurred in the early 1970s, a 
significant proportion of the last hired were the first fired.
For most of the 1960s the U.S. Department of Labor struggled to 
deal with the many thousand training contracts that it had negotiated in 
different sectors of the country, a reflection of the fact that 90 percent 
of the funding for MDTA came from the federal government. But with 
the passage of time it became increasingly clear that the operation of 
MDTA had to be decentralized to the states and the cities and the 
issue of public service employment for the hard-to-employ had to be 
faced. After President Nixon's election and assumption of office in
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early 1969, the Department of Labor and the interested committees of 
the Congress set about drafting a reform bill which included a limited 
appropriation for public service jobs. The members of the NMAC were 
at Camp David to explore the changes that would follow the new legis 
lation when a telephone call announced that the President had vetoed 
the bill on the ground that he wanted no part in reestablishing leaf-rak 
ing jobs reminiscent of the New Deal era.
Faced with a looser labor market in 1970-1971 and an acceleration 
in the release of soldiers who had fought in Vietnam, the President was 
willing to accept a substitute legislative reform package that included 
200,000 PSE jobs. The NMAC had put the issue of PSE and full 
employment on its agenda as early as 1965, but after an exploratory 
discussion had let the issue lie, having concluded that the time was not 
ripe for pressing ahead on that point. True, there were a few senators 
who wanted to move ahead with such a proposal, but it was clear to the 
NMAC that with the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the increasing 
unease of the Congress about the budgetary outlook, and the war- 
fueled expansion that was occurring in the job market, the time was not 
opportune for making a push for a full-employment policy.
It may be useful to recall that the "federal deficit" issue, which has 
dominated the Washington scene during the last fifteen years, resulted 
from actions taken in 1964 in which Congress adopted a counter-cycli 
cal spending and tax policy so that when the economy was slack the 
government would lower taxes and spend more and when the economy 
approached full utilization the reverse measures tax increases and 
moderation of spending rwould be followed. I thought at the time that 
it would be easier for Congress to learn the first lesson and forget the 
second which would result in a long-term loss, not a gain in macro- 
policy.
President Nixon's willingness to reverse his opposition to PSE was 
not only a reflection of the pluses and minuses of dealing with the 
Democrats who controlled the Congress, but also reflected the continu 
ing evolution of the role of manpower policy on the national scene. 
MDTA was seen as a vehicle for speeding the employment of Vietnam 
veterans, opening a new area of opportunity for manpower policy. 
Since the rate at which soldiers were sent home from Vietnam was rel 
atively modest and would continue over many months and even years, 
the availability of 200,000 PSE jobs to be used as needed to speed their
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reentry into the domestic labor force seemed appropriate. And there 
were many in the Congress who looked with favor on the rapproche 
ment between Republicans and Democrats who, until the President's 
veto, had worked closely together on manpower legislation.
By the time that MDTA approached its tenth and final year it had 
been pulled and pushed to respond to a great number of different "at- 
risk" persons for whom opportunity for training and later for a public 
service job held out some reasonable prospect of benefit. These 
included:
  Skilled workers who had lost their jobs because of automation
 Large numbers of poorly educated, poorly skilled adults who 
sought training from MDTA
  Young people, especially in low-income urban areas, who needed 
to earn some money during their summer vacations
  Young people who had dropped out of school before attaining a 
high school diploma and who could profit from the kind of new 
residential environment provided by the Job Corps where they 
could catch up on their education, obtain some basic skills, and be 
in a stronger position to make their way in the world of work
  The more disadvantaged members of the labor force who in addi 
tion to the drawbacks of limited education and skills also belonged 
to families trapped in poverty
  Older persons who might be helped to get a job or improve their 
earning capabilities if a modest number of training slots were 
reserved for them
  Prisoners, either current or recently released from the criminal jus 
tice system
  Returning Vietnam veterans
This list does not pretend to exhaust the many groups of disadvan 
taged persons identified as potential beneficiaries of the various types 
of training opportunities made available under MDTA.
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The Advent of CETA
With so many potential applicants for training slots, with MDTA 
relying primarily on vocational education and the employment service 
as the principal service deliverers, and with almost half of the budget 
spent on stipends, the tension between funding and the length and 
quality of the training that could be provided was with some exceptions 
very great. The inadequate basic educational skills of so many of the 
trainees only exacerbated the situation since the available funding was 
grossly inadequate to bring many of them up to an acceptable educa 
tional level and at the same time provide them with even modest skill 
training. The average MDTA enrollee had only 22 weeks in a training 
program, much too brief a period to make them competitive even for an 
entrance-level job. Even worse, the failure to decategorize and decen 
tralize the MDTA program further reduced its potential effectiveness. 
Fortunately, the Nixon administration and the Congress were able to 
agree on the passage of the Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act of 1973 (CETA). The new legislation decategorized by bringing 
together all elements of both MDTA and the Economic Opportunity 
Act which had launched the antipoverty effort (leaving only Job Corps 
free-standing) and decentralized by funneling most of the federal funds 
to prime sponsors that is, local planning agencies dominated by local 
and county officials who were given broad discretion in the selection of 
service deliverers.
The new CETA structure had been in place for only a relatively 
short period of time when the country experienced the most serious 
depression since the 1930-33 debacle. The Democratic leaders of the 
Congress were not satisfied with the antidepression recommendations 
forwarded by President Ford and decided to take the lead in designing 
policies and programs that would be more responsive. The subsequent 
transformation of CETA can only be understood in the light of previ 
ous approaches.
Shortly after Nixon defeated McGovern in the election of 1972 he 
made public his intention to streamline the federal government by con 
solidating a number of cabinet departments. Haldeman was initially 
scheduled to meet with the senior officials of the Department of Labor, 
who invited me to be present, but with Watergate preempting more of
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his time and energy, Ehrlichman came in his place. I have no clear rec 
ollection of what the details of his message were, but I think it per 
tained to the proposed merger of Labor and Commerce, together with 
plans for substantial cutbacks in programming and in staff. It was a 
most unpleasant presentation, since the speaker elicited no questions 
and tolerated no discussion. As an outsider listening in, I did not 
assume, as did many of the others in attendance, that all of the White 
House plans were misconceived and could lead only to trouble, but I 
was chilled by the arrogance of the speaker and concluded that with 
persons like him in senior staff roles at the White House, policies and 
programs were unlikely to be strengthened.
I was reminded of a comment that my long-term friend and col 
league Arthur F. Burns made to me on a walk to his home after dinner 
at the White House Mess during which we had avoided all serious sub 
jects. Burns had been serving at the time as Counsellor to the Presi 
dent. He said that he was unable to put his finger on just what disturbed 
him about the President's senior staff, but it was quite unlike anything 
he had ever experienced. Nothing seemed to be straightforward  
either in speech or in written communications. And there was little or 
no feedback. Burns said he had made up his mind to leave and to do so 
very shortly. Watching Ehrlichman in action at the Department of 
Labor reminded me of Burns' disquietude and determination to leave 
the administration. I too, from this single exposure, felt squeamish.
But in fairness, I must report on several more positive experiences 
with the Nixon administration. With the passage of CETA, the advisory 
committee structure underwent a significant change. The new legisla 
tion provided that the National Commission for Manpower Policy 
report to the President and Congress. William Kohlberg, the new Assis 
tant Secretary of Labor, asked me whether I would be willing to 
assume the chair of the new Commission but pointed out that I would 
have to obtain "political clearance" from the White House. This was 
the only time in my nineteen years of service as chairman that I had to 
obtain such clearance. The White House official with whom I talked 
was a reasonable and relaxed interviewer who did not press me very 
hard after I explained to him that as a New Yorker I had never enrolled 
in either party; that I had worked closely with President Eisenhower; 
and that I had worked constructively with key members of Congress of
Of Heart and Mind 121
both parties. I have no way of knowing whether and how thoroughly he 
checked me out, but my clearance came through expeditiously.
At one point near the end of the first or at the beginning of Nixon's 
second administration the insiders got nervous that the administration 
planned to cut back radically on its request for new manpower funding. 
Sar Levitan got in touch with me and suggested that we jointly set up 
an appointment with George Shultz, who was serving at the time as 
Secretary of the Treasury but who continued to be interested in the 
manpower domain and at the same time was viewed as one of the Pres 
ident's intimate advisors. Sar and I had no difficulty in arranging an 
early meeting with George, who provided us with ample time to set out 
our concerns and pinpoint the kinds of help that we thought the pro 
gram required. Subsequent to our visit the ominous rumors about the 
forthcoming emasculation of the manpower programs ceased.
The third "interaction" between the NMAC and then-President 
Nixon occurred when the Department sponsored a luncheon celebrat 
ing the tenth anniversary of MDTA. The President was invited to 
speak, but he could not accept, sending instead a warm letter of appre 
ciation to the members of the NMAC and to me commending us for 
our helpful participation in the shaping and reshaping of the program.
These observations enable us to pick up the main threads. There 
were a number of hearings and subsequent amendments to CETA, so 
that it could respond more successfully to the serious recession of 
1974-5.1 was asked to testify at these hearings as I had attended most 
congressional hearings during the two decades when various commit 
tees were reviewing issues that had been and continued to be of con 
cern to what was now called the National Commission for Manpower 
Policy. The main purpose of CETA had been to focus increasingly on 
the more disadvantaged members of the labor force who required assis 
tance to enable them to get and hold a job. But early on the rumor cir 
culated that the key members of the Congress, especially the 
Democratic leaders, were looking to CETA as a major solution to the 
growing unemployment brought on by the worsening recession.
In my testimony I tried very hard to be sympathetic to the proposals 
for expanding CETA to serve more effectively as an antirecession mea 
sure without undermining the increasing emphasis that the Congress 
had been placing on directing manpower efforts primarily to the more, 
if not the most, disadvantaged. I accepted the idea that a spell of a
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week's unemployment be made the basis for qualifying for a CETA job 
but that this brief period of unemployment be linked to family income, 
making eligibility for a CETA job depend on low family income even 
if the spell of unemployment was brief. I pointed out that with ever 
increasing numbers of women from middle and upper income homes 
entering the labor force, many for the first time, many CETA jobs 
would otherwise go to families that were not in need of federal assis 
tance.
As was my usual experience, the senators and representatives who 
showed up at the many hearings at which I testified were almost with 
out exception interested, polite, and occasionally probing. But this time 
I drew a blank. My arguments, no matter how formulated, failed to 
elicit any favorable response. I assume that the Democratic leadership 
wanted to go to the country and claim credit for having passed new leg 
islation that would address the worsening recession and permit all 
unemployed Americans, not just the poor, to profit from their actions.
Shortly after Ford replaced Nixon in the White House, Arthur 
Burns, at the time the chair of the Federal Reserve Board, invited me as 
a luncheon guest of honor to meet the senior economic officials of the 
new administration. There were about eight around the table. Early on, 
the conversation focused on what America most needed an inexpen 
sive auto. I listened attentively but could make little or no sense of the 
consensus that was early arrived at that such a car would assure the 
long-term success and expansion of the American economy. Fortu 
nately, there was one dissenter in the group the President's economic 
assistant who came from Michigan, who knew much about the auto 
mobile industry and could make little or no sense out of this suggestion 
either. Later on, when I had an opportunity to reflect on what had hap 
pened, I decided that such ramblings were a form of relaxation for offi 
cials who were forced most of the day to work very hard on very 
difficult issues.
In the course of my ongoing visits and talks with Arthur Burns I 
noted his increasing concern with the fact that nobody in Washington 
apparently had any idea about how to respond to the worsening reces 
sion other than to spend more money, an approach that did not appeal 
to him. If truth be told, it did not particularly appeal to me either, since 
I had never gotten over my childhood encounter with high inflation in 
Germany in 1922. At this point I offered Burns a deal. I would do my
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best to moderate the manpower spending proposals put forward by the 
National Commission for Manpower Policy if he in turn would recom 
mend that the federal government become the employer of last resort. 
The discussions continued for the better part of a year and Burns 
finally accepted the challenge in a speech at the University of Georgia 
in Augusta, adding a special twist these government jobs should be 
paid at 10 percent below the minimum wage!
Burns' Georgia address was largely ignored by the press but at a 
manpower conference some months later George Meany launched an 
all-out attack on Burns for recommending a federal wage 10 percent 
below the minimum wage even if the proposal carried with it the prom 
ise of a job for everybody who wanted to work. Senator Hubert Hum 
phrey alone remarked that he welcomed the support of Arthur Burns 
for the idea that the federal government had an obligation to help every 
unemployed person get a job if the private demand for workers fell 
short.
For the first time, except for the initial reception at the White House, 
members of the manpower advisory committees were asked to meet 
with President Ford for an exchange of information and views. During 
the first half of the meeting the President was an active participant in 
the two-way discussion, but after that he appeared to tire, lose interest, 
or both, to the dismay of his staff and of the advisory committee mem 
bers.
Many were surprised when Governor Carter a largely unknown 
name outside of the South captured the Democratic nomination for 
the Presidency in mid-year 1976, but no one was more surprised than I 
when, several weeks later, I received a phone call from Jody Powell 
from Georgia asking whether I would prepare a memorandum for the 
Governor on work and welfare. I explained that I had taken great care 
since my initial appointment as chair in 1962 not to become involved 
in partisan politics; that I had been reappointed by President Ford; and 
I could not possibly become involved in the presidential campaign. 
Powell replied that I had misunderstood the Governor's request. On the 
assumption that he won the election, he would like to move forward 
expeditiously with new reform legislation, and the paper that he was 
asking me to prepare was related to his postelection planning. In the 
face of this reassurance, I told him that I felt free to develop such a 
paper and would be pleased to do so if he could once more reassure me
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that it would not be used in any way in the current campaign. With 
renewed reassurance in hand I prepared a 35-page memorandum with 
suggestions as to the best ways of using employment and training poli 
cies to reduce the large numbers of long-term clients on welfare, 
emphasizing that all such clients of working age without major disabil 
ities should use these programs to improve their employability and 
become self-supporting, at least in part. I recall specifically that I 
emphasized the legitimacy of the federal government's requirement 
that recipients undertake appropriate training and/or PSE jobs to 
receive welfare support.
The end of this story is simple: Jody Powell kept his word. I suspect 
that some parts of my analysis and recommendations were helpful to 
the new President as he tackled the difficult subject with no greater 
success than his predecessors and successors. While my paper had 
oversimplified a very complicated subject, at least it did not point to an 
easy political solution.
President-elect Carter designated Ray Marshall of the University of 
Texas as his Secretary of Labor, and the two of us had dinner early on 
with Seymour Wolfbein of the Department who was a mutual friend. 
We reviewed a large number of issues that Marshall would soon con 
front. On the trip back to town, Marshall told me of the President's tre 
mendous enthusiasm for the PSE program and that in fact Marshall had 
to persuade him not to request funding for more than the 750,000 jobs 
proposed, since it seemed to him that neither the federal government 
nor the prime sponsors would be able to expand more rapidly. It is 
worth noting that Carter was the only one of the six presidents from 
Kennedy to Reagan who was enthusiastic about using manpower pol 
icy as the major stimulus for an economy that was operating at less 
than full capacity.
Nevertheless, one of the more confusing and discouraging episodes 
in the area of manpower legislation was the bungled manner in which 
the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth bill 
was handled. In an increasingly difficult environment of inflation, stag 
flation, and federal deficits and with no real constituency in favor of 
such a far-reaching proposal, the horrendous difficulties of implemen 
tation were left for a later time. Because of the decision of the Con 
gress to pay tribute to a distinguished colleague who had been stricken 
with a fatal disease, an innocuous piece of legislation was finally
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passed (1978), but it remained a tribute, not a challenge to new national 
action.
I arranged early on in the Carter administration to have a meeting 
with Dr. Charles Schultze, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advi 
sors to President Carter, to see how the National Commission for Man 
power Policy could be helpful to an administration that was clearly so 
partial to employment and training programs as a cyclical stimulus. I 
recognized after leaving Schultze's office that presidents and their eco 
nomic advisors did not always read the economy from the same per 
spective. Schultze did his best to mask his skepticism about the 
president's enthusiasm for manpower programs as a tool for macroeco- 
nomic stimulus. In any case Schultze conveyed to me that he did not 
believe there was much scope for cooperation between the Council of 
Economic Advisors and our Commission.
Since our Commission reported to both the President and the Con 
gress after each quarterly meeting, I was pleasantly surprised to find 
that not once, but repeatedly, the copy that I forwarded to the President 
was returned to me with marginal notes both substantive and stylistic. 
While I and my fellow committee members were clearly pleased with 
this evidence of presidential interest and concern, I for one wondered 
whether such careful readings and notations were warranted, given the 
extraordinary demands on the time and energy of the President. My 
concern was heightened as I observed the difficulties that Carter was 
having in assuming a leadership role and in developing relations with 
both the Congress and with the media, two centers of influence with 
which every successful president had to cooperate.
In early 1979 the President recognized that his administration was 
facing growing difficulties with inflation and other important issues, 
domestic and foreign. This led him to take counsel with a diverse group 
of advisors in meetings at Camp David preparatory to reorganizing the 
leadership of many Cabinet departments. I was invited to one of these 
Camp David retreats to which the top command of the nation's trade 
unions were present, together with selected leaders of the Senate and 
the House and a sprinkling of others including a few prominent indus 
trialists, making altogether about 35 to 40 persons.
Almost everyone present endorsed increased spending on manpower 
programs. My turn came near the end, and I took a different approach, 
emphasizing that the President faced certain defeat in a reelection bid
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if inflation was not brought under control, since further inflationary 
pressures would make it more difficult to prevent a downward spiral in 
the economy and the labor market. I urged the President to freeze his 
requests for additional federal spending on the manpower front but to 
avoid cutbacks in training for inner-city minority youth who had to be 
protected, no matter how severe inflationary pressures had become.
Even while I was pressing these points, I saw that several of the 
White House aides who were sitting on the outer rim looked at me as a 
traitor. After all, who would have expected the chair of the NCMP to 
advise the President to spend less, not more? The news of my "treach 
ery" reached the Washington insiders before I got back to town in the 
late afternoon. But it seemed to me at the time and since that the 
President was entitled to hear what his advisors recommended, not 
what their constituents desired. I was in the fortunate position of not 
having a constituency!
About six months later the President invited several of us who had 
been at Camp David to a luncheon at the White House to hear from 
him directly how he had moved to strengthen his administration. I had 
the good fortune to draw Mrs. Carter as my luncheon partner so I was 
able to hear not only the President's account, which was not all that 
clear, and Mrs. Carter's footnotes, which impressed me greatly. She 
clearly had a highly developed political sense and an ability to cut 
through verbiage and get quickly to the central points. It was a long 
and pleasant luncheon, but I came away almost certain that the Presi 
dent's reelection was doomed, even if he were to rely increasingly on 
his talented wife.
To return to the main theme the last years of CETA boasted an 
annual appropriation of around $12 billion or 50 times the initial 
appropriation for MDTA (in real dollars). With the passage of every 
year the media was able to identify new stories of program malfunc 
tioning, incompetence, lack of effectiveness, outright chicanery, and 
fraud. It appeared to me at the time, and on later reflection, that while 
each negative story probably was grounded in fact the overall impres 
sion building up in the public's mind that CETA was a failure was 
wrong. Most of the federal funds were spent on the poor, and after the 
1976 amendments on those who were the most disadvantaged. It was 
true, however, that the program failed to achieve its proposed objective 
of shifting the unemployed and underemployed poor into regular jobs.
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There were success stories of young men who went through a well- 
structured automotive mechanics course lasting eight or nine months 
who were then placed in regular jobs paying considerably above mini 
mum wage and who were able with the skills they had acquired not 
only to hold a job but even to advance. The most spectacular example 
of what a year's focused training could do was found among health 
aides and unskilled workers who at the end of their course became 
"licensed practical nurses" at a wage approximately double of what 
they had earned earlier and with further career and income mobility 
still before them. The young men who attended the residential Job 
Corps and completed the training cycle also appeared to be on their 
way to more education, greater skills, and better job prospects.
But after singling out these favorable outcomes for some who had 
been previously only marginally attached to the labor force and could 
now find a good opening, most of the CETA money went to education, 
training, and PSE work which improved the current earnings of these 
marginal persons but did not translate into real long-term gains for 
them in the labor market. Most of the applicants were too severely 
handicapped at the time that they applied, and there were too many of 
them to support a sufficiently long period of remedial education and 
training to change their long-term prospects.
Because many members of Congress, both Democrats and Republi 
cans, realized that CETA funding made it possible for the districts that 
they represented to do something positive for the many different 
groups of disadvantaged persons who lived in the area even if the 
federal programs could not lead most of the recipients into a regular 
job they continued to vote for new and larger appropriations. But 
when I appeared before the Senate Budget Committee in 1979 and 
underwent critical questioning by "liberal" Democrats, I realized that 
CETA was likely to be in serious trouble in the years ahead, particu 
larly if the next Republican candidate for the presidency adopted a crit 
ical stance towards the program, which in fact Reagan did. Had it not 
been for some astute maneuvering by the leadership of the National 
Alliance of Business, which had the interest and support of many liber 
ally inclined leaders of the employer community, Reagan in his first 
year would have liquidated the program completely rather than accept 
ing a large-scale reduction in the previous rate of spending for the new 
JTPA program.
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Reprise
This review of my role as chair of the successive advisory commit 
tees between 1962 and 1981 gives me the opportunity to revisit and 
reappraise MDTA and CETA as follows:
  Federal manpower policy as exemplified initially by MDTA and 
reinforced by related efforts of the Great Society program of 1964- 
67 represented in the first instance ad hoc efforts of members of 
Congress concerned with assisting various groups that faced above 
average difficulties in the labor market. There was no broad con 
stituency, intellectual or political, to expand the role of the federal 
government to make it a significant third party in addition to 
employers and trade unions to improve the functioning of the 
U.S. labor market.
  Mainline macroeconomists who advised the successive presidents 
and held key positions in policy formulation had little if any inter 
est in manpower policy early in the 1960s or late in the 1970s. 
They were preoccupied with budgetary and fiscal instruments that 
could affect the level of total employment. The lack of interest 
among mainline economists in manpower policy resulted in inade 
quate evaluations of the ongoing programs and only sporadic 
attempts to strengthen them.
  With the single exception of Jimmy Carter, none of the six presi 
dents from Kennedy to Reagan had any interest in using manpower 
policy as a major instrument for effecting desirable changes in the 
economy. Accordingly, most of the public, which understood little 
about the potential and limitations of manpower policy, failed to 
become actively involved.
  The fact that for the better part of a decade the federal government 
sought to oversee, if not directly run, employment and training 
programs throughout the fifty states and in all of the nation's larger 
cities almost guaranteed poor performance. Although CETA led to 
the decategorization and decentralization of manpower programs, 
difficulties remained in creating a strong infrastructure, given the 
bureaucratic history of vocational education, the weaknesses of
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most employment services, and the preference of most employers 
to keep their distance from governmental efforts to reshape the 
labor market. The countervailing forces were community leaders, 
new federal dollars, and a growing body of knowledge and experi 
ence about how to restructure and improve employment and train 
ing programs.
In sum, this personal revisit to MDTA and CETA was a lesson for 
me about the relative flexibility in the use of new federal dollars in the 
1960s and 1970s on behalf of disadvantaged persons, despite little 
prior planning and limited attention to organization, administration, 
and evaluation. Manpower funding in the 1960s and 1970s reflected a 
particular phase in the development of American democracy where 
efforts at improvement have often exceeded accomplishments. But in 
the long run, a society that is willing to make efforts on behalf of the 
weak and vulnerable is surely to be preferred to a society that is 
focused on maintaining the status quo.
